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ABSTRACT   This study demonstrates that the differentiated organisatational constellation 
of the European Union (EU) contribute to a differentiated penetration of domestic government 
decision-making processes. The question posed is how different EU institutions, notably the 
European Commission and the Council of Ministers, accompany a differentiated level of 
hierarchical decision-making processes within domestic central administrations. To account 
for this differentiated impact, this study outlines two theoretical approaches: one 
‘administrative integration approach’ claiming that different EU institutions have a 
differentiated impact on domestic hierarchical governance, and one ‘administrative robustness 
approach’ advocating the differentiated “EU effect” is filtered, mediated and modified 
through existing domestic decision-making routines and practices. This article compares the 
actual decision-making processes within the central administrative apparatus of two countries 
which are differentially integrated in the EU, Norway and Sweden. The empirical analysis, 
based on a rich body of existing survey and interview data, indicates that the European 
Commission informally activates the lower echelons of the domestic government hierarchies, 
notably sector experts within sector agencies and sector ministries. Furthermore, the European 
Commission tend to de-activate the domestic politico-administrative leadership, the Foreign 
Office and the Prime Ministers Office. By contrast, the Council of Ministers seems to 
strengthen the formal domestic pyramidal hierarchy of governance. Consequently, in the case 
of Norway a strong informal penetration happens between the European Commission and 
domestic government institutions largely outside the control of the domestic politico-
administrative leadership. In Sweden this tendency is somewhat counterbalanced due to the 
inter-sectorally interlocking effect of the Council of Ministers. Finally, this study highlights 
that domestic government institutions, to some extent, bias and filters the differentiated effect 
of the European Commission and the Council of Ministers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There are many roads to the diverse decision-making dynamics that unfolds within European 
central administrations. The institutionalist and social constructivist schools of 
Europeanisation has revealed how the “EU effect” is filtered and mediated through domestic 
institutionalised rules, norms and cultures (e.g. Bulmer and Burch 2005; Checkel 2005; 
Hèretier et al. 2001). Less emphasis has been put on how cross-national differences as regards 
government decision-making processes may be caused by the differentiated organisational 
constellation of the European Union (EU) system. This study demonstrates that the 
differentiated organisatational structure of the EU contribute to a differentiated penetration of 
domestic government decision-making processes. The question posed is how different EU 
institutions, notably the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, accompany a 
differentiated level of hierarchical decision-making processes within domestic central 
administrations. Based on a rich body of existing survey and interview data this article 
compares the actual decision-making processes within the central administrative apparatus of 
two countries which have been differentially integrated towards the EU during ten years, 
Norway and Sweden. 
 
The mutual exclusiveness of domestic and foreign affairs within domestic government 
systems is increasingly challenged by the multi-level interaction between domestic civil 
servants and international bureacracies (Cassese 1987; Rosenau 1997; Scheinman and Feld 
1972; Underdal 1987). Multi-level interaction has become an institutionalised habit for 
domestic civil servants within sector ministries as well as subordinated agencies (Beyers and 
Trondal 2004; Olsen 2003a). EU institutions open new arenas for direct and intimate 
interaction between the public administrations of the member-states and between the domestic 
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public administrations and the community institutions (Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal 2003). 
This study argues that the European Commission and the Council of Ministers have a 
differentiated impact on the behavioural logics of domestic public administrations because 
these EU institutions are organised according to different generic principles. Arguably, multi-
level interaction towards the European Commission happens partly outside the control of the 
domestic Prime Ministers Office (PMO), Foreign Office (FO) and the politico-administrative 
leadership because the classical territorial logic of state-by-state politics is challenged by this 
supranational executive. On the other hand, multi-level interaction directed towards the 
Council of Ministers is more strongly governed by the domestic PMO, FO and the politico-
administrative leadership. Hence, whereas the Council of Ministers arguably strengthen the 
domestic politico-administrative leadership the European Commission tend to weaken the 
power of that same leadership. 
 
The dependent variable of this study is the actual decision-making processes unfolding within 
the Norwegian and Swedish central administrations generally, and more specifically the 
degrees of hierarchical decision-making processes therein. The empirical yardstick of 
hierarchical decision-making is the extent to which the politico-administrative leadership 
ultimately controls the decision-making processes that unfold within domestic government 
institutions. Hierarchical decision-making denotes that “the most important policy decisions 
[are] taken at the apex of a government organisation … and those lower down in the hierarchy 
merely … carry them out” (Page 1992:61). De-hierarchisation refers to the fact that important 
decisions are crafted autonomously by civil servants in the lower echelons of the government 
hierarchy. Decision-making behaviour refers to the contacts, co-ordination patterns and 
priorities made by civil servants. A de-hierarchisation of decision-making behaviour thus 
denotes civil servants having few contacts with the policio-administrative leadership, 
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receiving few priorities from this leadership, and/or co-ordinate more among fellow peers 
horizontally than with the leadership vertically.  
 
Wheres the Swedish EU membership has integrated the Swedish administrative apparatus into 
both the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, the Norwegian associated 
membership (through the EEA agreement) has (partly) integrated the Norwegian government 
fabric solely to the Commission system. Empirically, the cases of Norway and Sweden 
demonstrate how the European Commission contributes to informally circumvent the 
domestic decision-making hierarchy whereas the Council of Ministers mainly contributes to 
uphold formal domestic politico-administrative control and oversight. The study thus reveals 
that the territorial organisational structure of the Council of Ministers tend to strengthen the 
Swedish politico-administrative elites, the PMO and the FO. However, the Swedish and the 
Norwegian cases also demonstrate that ten years of differentiated integration in the EU have 
not fundamentally transformed decision-making processes within the domestic central 
administrations. This study reveals that trends towards a de-hierarchisation of government 
decision-making processes are modified by the Council of Ministers (in Sweden) and filtered, 
edited and translated through domestic institutional rules, practices and traditions (in Norway 
and Sweden).  
 
Constitutionally there are significant differences between the Swedish and Norwegian central 
administrations (Petersson 1994:127). The government of Norway applies ministerial rule and 
administrative monism accompanying a closer formal relationship between the minister, his 
Cabinet, and subordinated agencies (Lægreid and Pedersen 1999). In this system, “the 
ministers are always accountable for the actions of a directorate” (Jacobsson, Lægreid and 
Pedersen 2004:16). There are currently 17 Norwegian ministries employing approximately 
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4000 civil servants. The average Norwegian ministry contains 235 civil servants. The 
Norwegian FO is by far the largest with 659 officials (St.prp. nr. 1 (2004-2005)). In Sweden 
ministerial rule is not permitted and the central administration is divided into ministries and 
semi-autonomous agencies (administrative dualism). The 12 Swedish ministries are larger 
than the Norwegian ministries, employing approximately 4300 officials. The Swedish FO is 
by far the largest with 1500 civil servants (Premfors et al. 2003: 148). The average Swedish 
ministry thus contains 361 civil servants.  Moreover, several tens of thousand Swedish 
officials are employed in the subordinated Swedish agencies (Petersson 1994:130). Both 
Norway and Sweden are unitary states with well developed parliamentary democracies and 
stabile administrative systems. In both countries directorates beneath the ministry level enjoy 
substantial de facto autonomy. Therefore, the differences between the Norwegian and the 
Swedish central administrative apparatuses are less significant in practice than judged by the 
Constitutional texts.  
 
The wave of public management reforms has marked a tendency towards stronger vertical 
specialisation of administrative units through a devolution of semi-autonomous agencies in 
both countries (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). A classical tension has prevailed in Norway 
and Sweden between ministerial governance and agency autonomy for several decades. This 
conflict has centred on two dimensions: that between vertical politico-administrative control 
versus professional neutrality, and that between horizontal co-ordination versus sectoral 
departmentalisation (Jacobsen 1960). The argument presented by this study is that the 
European Commission and the Council of Ministers affect these two dimensions of decision-
making processes differently.  
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The article proceeds as follows. The next section presented is an ‘administrative integration 
approach’ claiming that different EU institutions have profound and differentiated impact on 
hierarchical governance within domestic central administrations. The second approach is an 
‘administrative robustness approach’ advocating that decision-making processes within 
domestic central administrations adapt less effectively and accurately towards EU institutions 
than claimed by the first approach. The second section provides a comparative empirical 
analysis on how the European Commission and the Council of Ministers impact differently on 
degrees of hierarchical decision-making processes within the Norwegian and the Swedish 
central administrative institutions. The stock of empirical observations presented rest on a rich 
body of existing survey and interview data. 
 
THEORISING DIFFERENTIATED DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
This section outlines two supplementary theoretical approaches that render understandable 
how different EU institutions impact differently on degrees of hierarchical decision-making 
processes. First, one ‘administrative integration approach’ is presented claiming that different 
EU institutions accompany different levels of hierarchical decision-making within domestic 
government systems. Secondly, one ‘administrative robustness approach’ is outlined arguing 
that the “EU effect” is mediated and filtered through domestic decision-making routines and 
practices.  
 
An administrative integration approach 
This approach builds on a generic organisation theory perspective, not on sui generis theories 
of administrative fusion as suggested by Wolfgang Wessels (1998). One advantage of 
applying a general or ‘cosmopolitan’ approach like organisation theory is the possibilities of 
drawing general inferences from single-case studies (Kohler-Koch 2003:7). An organisation 
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theory perspective assumes that civil servants employed in government institutions are 
bounded rational faced with information overload, computational limitations and a complex 
web of roles to play. The role as a civil servant is ambiguous with a multifaceted and complex 
set of role-expectations embedded. The vertical and horizontal specialisation of public 
administration serves to systematically buffer the information and role expectations relevant 
for each civil servant, thereby simplifying their preference formation and ultimately choice of 
decision-making behaviour (Egeberg 1999; Thelen and Steimno 1992). The local rationality 
of civil servants is systematically aggregated by this buffer function into organisational 
rationality (Gulick 1937; Simon 1957). Consequently, the organisational selection of relevant 
information, premises for decision making and role enactment affects how civil servants 
think, feel and act.  
 
Organisational dynamics are triggered when organisational borders are cirss-crossed in day-
to-day decision-making (Egeberg 1999). Arguably, the organisational borders between 
domestic administrative systems and the EU institutions are increasingly by-passed and 
weakened (Kohler-Koch 2003). The EU institutions and domestic government apparatuses 
interact in day-to-day policy-making through a complex web of EU committees, the system of 
seconded civil servants, through embassies, as well as informal networks of civil servants 
(Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal 2003; Lewis 2000; Trondal 2004a; Van Schendelen and 
Scully 2003). Assumable, civil service systems that frequently interact tend to become 
increasingly similar in organisational terms, with respect to the decision-making processes 
unfolding, as well as the public policy crafted (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Wessels 1998). 
Assuming that formal organisations focus the attention of bounded rational actors, national 
government systems with intimate contact towards EU institutions are likely to become 
systematically affected as regards their decision-making practices.  
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According to the classical administration school of Luther Gulick (1937), organisations may 
be horizontally specialised according to four principles: purpose, process, territory and 
clientele. The horizontal principles of purpose and process are observed in most domestic 
sector ministries and agencies, in the European Commission DGs, in the subordinated 
agencies of the Commission as well as in the web of Commission expert committees (Egeberg 
and Trondal 1999; Peters 1995:147). Arguably, civil servants who frequently interact within 
administrative systems organised by purpose and process are assumed to evoke decision-
making behaviour that reflects their sectoral portfolios and professional skills, respectively. 
These civil servants are likely to perceive themselves as Weberian civil servants abiding rules 
and established practices within their portfolios as well as independent and neutral experts, 
respectively. These officials are less likely to act on fixed mandates issued by the politico-
administrative leadership or to negotiate within the Council of Ministers on the basis of fixed 
national mandates written by the domestic FO and PMO. The latter behavioural pattern is 
arguably activated within territorially specialised organisations, such as domestic FOs and the 
Council of Ministers (see below). 
 
According to this line of argumentation, the decision-making behaviour evoked by civil 
servants is contingent on the organisational properties of the administrative systems in which 
they are embedded. Henceforth, different EU institutions – notably the European Commission 
and the Council of Ministers – are likely to condition domestic decision-making processes 
differently. Whereas the European Commission is likely to foster a horizontal fragmentation 
of domestic decision-making processes and a weakening of domestic politico-administrative 
leadership, the Council of Ministers is likely to accompany domestic horizontal coherence 
across policy sectors and a demand for strengthening of domestic politico-administrative 
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leadership (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). Wheres the Swedish EU membership has integrated 
the Swedish administrative apparatus into both the European Commission and the Council of 
Ministers, the Norwegian associated membership (through the EEA agreement) has (partly) 
integrated the Norwegian government fabric solely to the Commission system.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates that intimate interaction between domestic sector ministries and the 
European Commission contributes to turn the domestic pyramidal hierarchy of governance 
upside-down. Assumable, the European Commission activates the lower echelons of the 
domestic government hierarchies, notably sector experts within sector agencies and sector 
ministries. Arguably, the European Commission de-activates the domestic politico-
administrative leadership, the FO and the PMO. 
 
-- Figure 1 about here -- 
 
According to Luther Gulick (1937) organisations may be organised to accommodate territorial 
interests and concerns. Domestically, local prefectual officies as well as FOs are examples of 
territorially organised government bodies. The FO has the task of diplomatic representation 
abroad and to integrate national preferences that cross-cuts the portfolio of sector ministries. 
Traditionally the FO has been organised outside the domain of ‘domestic’ politics and outside 
the institutional turf-wars between sector ministries and the Finance Ministry (Christensen 
1996). By this specialised organisational solution issues pertaining to other states as well as to 
international organisations are supposed to be co-ordinated by the FO. At the EU level the 
best example of territorial organisation is the Council of Ministers, particularly at the Minister 
level and the COREPER – including the Antici and Mertens groups (Egeberg and Trondal 
1999; Sherrington 2000). Examples of organisation by purpose and process, however, are also 
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present within the Council, notably at the level of working groups and within the Council 
Secretariat (Christiansen 2001). However, national civil servants participating in Council 
working groups are expected to represent their governments and speak with “one voice” 
(Beyers and Trondal 2004; Larsson 2003:164).  
 
Arguably, the Council of Ministers is likely to activate territorially organised domestic 
ministries like domestic FOs, PMOs and the Ministry of Finance, with horizontally co-
ordinating roles within the Government. Moreover, these ministries contribute to a domestic 
filtering of the sectoral dynamics that may penetrate from the European Commission 
(Egeberg and Trondal 1999). The Swedish EU membership allows Swedish civil servants to 
participate in the Council of Ministers whereas the EEA agreement excludes Norwegian civil 
servants from attending Council meetings. Accordingly, the Council system is likely to 
strengthen hierarchical decision-making processes within the Swedish central administration 
but not within the Norwegian central administration. Hence, the Swedish FO is likely to be 
activated when ‘national interests’ are at stake in the Council of Ministers whereas the 
Norwegian FO is less likely to be activated by the European Commission. Consequently, the 
Norwegian civil service is likely to be strongly penetrated by the sector-dynamics of the 
European Commission and experience a decline of the powers of the FO, PMO and the 
politico-administrative leadership (Figure 1). By contrast, the Swedish FO and PMO are 
likely to be partly empowered by the Council of Ministers (Figure 2) and partly weakened by 
the European Commission (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 2 illustrates how intimate interaction between domestic ministries (and agencies) and 
the Council of Ministers may contribute to uphold the domestic pyramidal hierarchy of 
governance.  
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-- Figure 2 about here -- 
 
An administrative robustness approach 
Bureaucratic organisations tend to develop added value “beyond the technical requirements of 
the task at hand” (Selznick 1957:17). Processes of infusion ultimately contribute to give the 
organisation an embodiment of purpose that provides a conservative institutional logic 
preserving existing decision-making processes (Sryker and Strathan 1985). Processes of 
infusion create a unique culture, identity, or soul to organisations, promoting resistance 
against abrupt change patterns (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). The administrative robustness 
approach claims that institutionalised organisations are fairly robust against abrupt changes in 
administrative structures, routines and decision-making processes (March and Olsen 1989). 
Accordingly, intimate interaction between the European Commission and the Council of 
Ministers on the one hand and domestic government institutions on the other are not likely to 
radically transform domestic decision-making processes. The differentiated impact stemming 
from the Commission and the Council is likely to be filtered, edited and translated through 
existing domestic decision-making routines and practices (Olsen 2003b). Whereas the 
’administrative integration approach’ is based on an underlying assumption of bounded 
rationality, the administrative robustness approach is based on assumptions going beyond the 
logic of consequentiality (March and Olsen 1989). The central logic is that of human beings 
as collections of identities, roles, cognition, emotions and senses of belongingness, and that 
decision-making behaviour is guided by processes of matching these properties to particular 
situations (March and Olsen 1989). A central underlying assumption is that civil servants’ 
decision-making behaviour is a product of such matching-processes. The choice of decision-
making behaviour is ultimately determined by perceptions of self, perceptions of relevant 
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situation as well as perceptions of how these properties should be linked appropriately (March 
and Olsen 1989).  
 
Organisational boundaries are more than buffers to the attention of decision-makers. 
Organisational boundaries are normative, ethical, symbolic and temporal orders (Egeberg 
1994:85). They grow, blossom and die through long “historical processes of interpretation, 
learning and habituation” (Olsen 1995:28). Drawing and redrawing organizational borderlines 
not only affect decision-making behaviour on the basis of cognitive search-processes, but also 
on the basis of matching identities and role perceptions to particular situations (Brunsson and 
Olsen 1997). Parallel to the ‘hermeneutic circle’, path-dependencies implies that future 
changes of decision-making processes are conditioned by past and present decision-making 
practices (Adler 1997:321). One impact of this argument is that archaeological layers of 
decision-making routines and practices are stored within government institutions. 
Accordingly, it becomes easier to adopt new decision-making practices than to remove old 
ones due to the added value attached to existing practices (March and Olsen 1989). It also 
becomes easier to reorganise the balance between pre-existing behavioural practices than to 
add new practices or to subtract old ones. With March’ words: “An individual who has been 
negotiating a tough contract as an antagonistic lawyer carries that identity over to the role of 
diner in a restaurant or driver on a highway” (March 1994:70). In the EU-context, national 
officials who have just arrived at the EU meeting are likely to re-activate pre-established 
decision-making behaviour, preferences and roles of a domestic origin. 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
This study benefits from a multitude of data streams that derive from a rich body of empirical 
research. Two important sources of survey data on the Norwegian case are provided by a 
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large-scale survey study among Norwegian civil servants in 1996 (N = 1479 at the ministerial 
level and N = 1024 at the agency level) (Christensen and Egeberg 1997) as well as a recent 
comprehensive survey study among civil servants in the Norwegian central administration (N 
= 510) (Audit General of Norway 2005). One comparative study of Norwegian and Swedish 
civil servants attending Commission expert committees and Council working groups (N = 
116) (Trondal 2001) is also utilised together with a large scale comparative study of the 
Nordic central administrations (N = 260 on the Norwegian central administration, N = 345 on 
the Swedish central administration) (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2004). Hence, this 
study utilises existing bodies of empirical research on the Europeanisation of the Norwegian 
and Swedish central government institutions in order to illustrate the differentiated impact of 
different EU institutions on domestic government decision-making processes. 
  
One caveat is needed: The empirical data streams presented are not produced on a joint 
comparative template at the same point in time. Neither are they based on similar proxies. 
Hence the data do not warrant a thorough test of the causal relationships claimed by the above 
theoretical perspectives. The next section is thus organised by country and not by theoretical 
perspective. Furthermore, the space of this article does not allow for extensive empirical 
presentations, only for discerning general empirical patterns.    
 
NORWAY AND SWEDEN COMPARED 
Ten years ago referendums were held almost simultaneously in Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
Austria on the question of EU membership. In Norway 52,2 percent voted in favour of 
rejecting a EU membership, while 57 percent of the Finish voters, 66,6 percent of the 
Austrian voters, and 52 precent of the Swedish voters favoured a EU membership (Höll, 
Pollack and Puntscher-Riekmann 2003:338; Tiilikainen 2003: 150). Consequently, Sweden 
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and Norway, with rather similar politico-administrative systems chose different affiliations to 
the EU. Analytically, this offers an opportunity to compare how two fairly similar government 
systems have been affected differently by the EU due to different forms of affiliation towards 
the EU during a ten years period (1994-2004). This section demonstrates that when the state 
joins the EU the preconditions for domestic ececutive governance change by the differentiated 
impact of different EU institutions (Engel 2003; Kassim, Peters and Wright 2000). 
 
Actual decision-making processes within the Norwegian central administration 
Norway has been pictured as an adaptive non-member of the EU (Sverdrup 1998). In the 
period 1997 to 2003 Norway adopted 2.129 (18,5 per cent) of the 11.511 new regulations 
decided by the EU (Nationen 2004). In sum, Norway has adopted 4.600 EU regulations in the 
period 1994 to 2004 (Dagbladet 2004). These observations indicate that Norwegian public 
policy has adapted flexibly towards new EU regulations (Claes and Tranøy 1999). However, 
studies show little evidence of a large-scale re-organisation of the Norwegian central 
administrative system due to the EU (Jacobssen, Lægreid and Pedersen 2004). Our focus, 
however, is neither on policy adaptation nor on re-organisation of the formal administrative 
apparatuses but on the actual decision-making processes unfolding within the Norwegian 
central administrative apparatus. 
 
The Norwegian case shows evidence of a de-hierarchisation of the decision-making processes 
in the central administrative apparatus. A comprehensive study of the decision-making 
processes within the Norwegian central administration in 1996 showed that approximately 50 
per cent of the civil servants were affected by the EU and/or the EEA agreement. 22 per cent 
of the sector ministry officials and 13 per cent of the agency officials reported having attended 
Commission expert committees. Only very few officials had experiences from the comitology 
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committees (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). Moreover, the Norwegian central administration, 
with the exception of the FO, had witnessed a remarkable stabile level of participation in the 
Commission expert committees from 1994 to 1999: 252 committees in 1994, 200 committees 
in 1995, 207 committees in 1996, 211 committees in 1997, and 200 committees in 1999 
(Egeberg and Trondal 1999: 138; Statskonsult 2001:15). At present a minority of Norwegian 
top civil servants belong to the core segment of very active EU committee participants 
(Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2004:51). Norwegian officials attending EU committees 
are mostly from the agency level and the majority is employed in lower rank positions. They 
are typically professional experts with fairly loose ties towards the domestic politico-
administrative leadership (Statskonsult 1999:6:27). Yet, when attending Commission expert 
committees, these officials tend to perceive their role as that of a national representative in 
addition to the role as independent expert and a supranational agent (Trondal 2004b). Notably, 
Norwegian government officials attending the Commission expert committees attend with 
ambiguous mandates. They generally receive few clear instructions and signals from the 
politico-administrative leadership (Statskonsult 1999:6:44). According to one Norwegian civil 
servant, “the EEA work does not get the necessary daily attention from the top management” 
(Statskonsult 2002:5:19 – authors’ translation). 
 
Few Norwegian officials are accustomed to a written procedure for co-ordinating EU dossiers, 
and actual co-ordination is mostly done post hoc to the EU committee meetings, marginally 
involving the politico-administrative leadership (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2004: 39; 
Sætereng 2001). The Norwegian central administration is more adequately co-ordinated intra-
ministerially than inter-ministerially when approaching the European Commission. Moreover, 
these co-ordination processes are less formalised and routinised than intended by the 
Norwegian PMO and FO. More generally, the formal co-ordination apparatus for EU/EEA 
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dossiers is activated less frequently than officially intended by the Norwegian PMO (Audit 
General of Norway 2005). This domestic co-ordination apparatus is more active post hoc 
when implementing EU regulations than ex ante in the agenda setting phase of the 
Commission expert committee meetings (Statskonsult 1999:6 and 2002:5:37). However, 
ministries heavily affected by EU dossiers and strongly involved in EU committee meetings 
seem to have better co-ordination capacities than those ministries less involved in EU affairs 
(Statskonsult 2001:15: 15). Finally, the ministry-level seems better co-ordinated than the 
agency-level, and officials in top rank positions (typically heads of unit) are more adequately 
mandated than officials in lower rank positions (Statskonsult 2001:15:16; Trondal 2004b).  
 
The above observations parallel the observations of Swedish agency officials attending 
Commission expert committees (see the next section). Trondal and Veggeland (2003) show 
that Norwegian and Swedish officials attending the Commission expert committees evoke 
fairly similar roles – national, functional and supranational roles respectively (ordered by 
importance). The Commission expert committees, however, have a stronger functional 
dynamic than both the Council working groups and the comitology committees, 
accompanying lower levels of inter-sectoral co-ordination among participants in the 
Commission expert committees than among Council working group and comitology 
committee participants (Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal 2003). Moreover, during the so-called 
‘interim period’ for Norway in 1994, when Norway prepared for EU membership, Norwegian 
civil servants attended Council working groups. Trondal (1999) shows that this period was 
market by increased inter-ministerial co-ordination and a substantial co-ordinating role for the 
Norwegian FO vis-à-vis meetings in the Council working groups and the COREPER. After 
1994 Norway lost the right to attend Council working groups. One notable impact was that 
the degree of inter-ministerial co-ordination decreased, and that the co-ordinating role of the 
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Norwegian FO diminished relative to the co-ordinating role of sector ministries and agencies 
(Christensen 1996; Trondal 1999). Moreover, the relative power that the Norwegian PMO has 
on EU affairs seems to correlate with the political party in office. For example, whereas Prime 
Minister Brundtland from the Labour party “was personally strongly committed to EU 
membership and made it a central part of her political agenda for the 1990s” (Narud and 
Strøm 2000:141), the current Prime Minister Bondevik from the Christian Democratic party is 
an reluctant European officially against Norwegian membership in the EU. 
 
The declining role of the Norwegian FO vis-à-vis the sector ministries is a long trend in all 
EU member-states (Wessels, Maurer and Mittag 2003). In Norway East (1984:127) reported 
early that officials in the Norwegian FO tended to be more concerned with intra-ministerial 
co-ordination than inter-ministerial co-ordination, and that the Norwegian FO was more 
effective on inter-ministerial co-ordination on bilateral issues that went beyond Europe. By 
contrast, the international activities of Norwegian agencies’ are more narrowly oriented 
towards the European hemisphere (Underdal 1987:182). Hence, the European Commission 
seems to accelerate an already ongoing weakening of the Norwegian FO (Christensen 1996). 
EU dossiers handled by the European Commission are highly technical, requiring specialised 
knowledge to disentangle and influence successfully. As typical generalists in foreign affairs 
and diplomatic encounters, most Norwegian FO officials lack the professional capabilities 
available to sector-experts in the sector ministries and agencies to substantially and 
instrumentally handle EU dossiers (Claes 2003:92; Kassim, Peters and Wright 2000: 239). 
For example, relatively few officials from the Norwegian FO attend Commission committee 
meetings (Egeberg and Trondal 1999:138). These observations support the picture of The 
Norwegian FO as that of a “post-box” between the Norwegian sector ministries and agencies 
and the European Commission (Trondal 1999).  
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Officials at the Norwegian delegation to the EU have more direct contact with sector 
ministries than preferred by the Norwegian FO (Statskonsult 2002:5:18). Also, Norwegian 
ministers are loosely coupled to processes of negotiation within Council meetings 
(Statskonsult 2002:5). Moreover, Norwegian MPs are less actively involved in EU/EEA 
affairs than the MPs of most EU member-states. The Norwegian Parliamentary EEA 
committee have few meetings, handle few EU dossiers instrumentally, and have weak 
administrative resources to control the Norwegian central administration on EU dossiers 
(Melsæther and Sverdrup 2004; Sørensen 2004). The Norwegian Parliamentary EEA 
committee may not issue mandates to the Government on EU/EEA dossiers. Notably, some 
Norwegian political parties have better access to the European Parliament through their 
European party federations than the Norwegian Parliament as an institution (Nordby and 
Veggeland 1999:89; Statskonsult 2002:5).  
 
“[G]overnments deal with European affairs much as they manage domestic affairs” (Engel 
2003:245). The Norwegian central administration is no exception. The Norwegian central 
administration seems more sectorally de-coupled, de-politicised and fragmented than 
territorially integrated, politicised and co-ordinated when handling EU dossiers. With respect 
to how the Norwegian central administration handles EU dossiers, it is pictured as reactive, 
de-politicised and horizontally fragmented (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2004), even 
vertically disintegrated “whereby ‘micro-decisions’ tend to be de-coupled from the overall 
policy purpose and strategy” (Underdal 1987:170). EU dossiers are largely integrated into the 
day-to-day decision-making routines of Norwegian sector ministries, agencies, divisions and 
units (Egeberg and Trondal 1997: 342). Hence, the Norwegian central administration displays 
more horizontal fragmentation than co-ordination between ministries, and more horizontal 
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fragmentation between ministries than within them. The Norwegian case indicates that ten 
years of intimate relationship between national sector ministries and the European 
Commission has strengthened trends towards horizontal inter-ministerial fragmentation. 
Secondly, ten years of interaction between Norwegian sector ministries and the European 
Commission has accompanied a weakening of hierarchical decision-making processes within 
the Norwegian central government apparatus (cf. Figure 1).  
 
Actual decision-making processes within the Swedish central administration 
The principle of ministerial rule is not applied in Sweden. The Swedish central administration 
consists of the Government and its office (the Chancery) and the central administrative 
authorities underneath (hereafter called agencies). These agencies are accountable to the 
Government as a collective. The Chancery is divided into 12 ministries, but is nevertheless 
supposed to function as a collective unit. The largest number of civil servants works at the 
agencies, not at the Chancery (Larsson 2002). 
 
The absence of formal ministerial rule in Sweden is not the only factor that restricts the potential 
for ministerial rule over the agencies. Chapter 11, Paragraph 7 of the Instrument of Government 
clearly states that the Swedish Government cannot interfere with how agecies interpret laws 
adopted by the Riksdag. Furthermore, ministers are not responsible for how agencies interpret 
laws and regulations. A large part of the activities of the agencies does not, however, concern the 
application of laws or the exercise of public authority. The general tendency is to offer the 
agencies a fairly free hand. However, the contacts and relationship between an agency and its 
ministry are quite often both frequent and close (Jacobsson 1984).  
 
Prior to the Swedish EU membership in 1995 the autonomy of the Swedish agencies was never 
seriously questioned by the Swedish Government. The relationship between the ministries and 
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the agencies may be pictured as interdependent. The ministries are small compared to many 
agencies, which means that their expert knowledge in most technical dossiers is limited 
(Petersson 1994). Expert competences are found among civil servants at the agencies. Due to the 
size and complexity of the Government’s agenda, the Government depends on the active 
participation of agencies in the preparation and formulation of policies. In addition, many of the 
civil servants in the ministries have been recruited from the agencies underneath. Furthermore, it 
is not uncommon for senior civil servants of agencies to have previous careers in the Chancery, a 
fact that contributes to the development of shared epistemic and normative communities that 
span the ministry/agency divide (Larsson 1993). 
 
The Swedish Constitution describes a Government with far-reaching collective responsibility and 
a Chancery with a well integrated staff organisation for hierarchical co-ordination and planning. 
Today, a Swedish minister cannot hope to overview all activities of other ministries, unless they 
directly influence his or her own portfolio. Therefore, Swedish ministers act in much the same 
way as ministers in other countries – according to their sector portfolio (Page 1992). The 
organisational boundaries between Swedish ministries are intact, and the civil servants often 
have well developed instincts for ministerial territories (Premfors et al. 2003: 151). What 
constitutionally appears to be a tightly horizontally integrated government system often displays 
weak hierarchical co-ordination. However, the Swedish EU membership has added increased 
pressure on the Government to further improve the co-ordination of EU dossiers and strengthen 
the co-ordination role of the PMO and the FO (Sundström 1999).  
 
Similarly to the Norwegian case, the Swedish central administration is often represented in the 
Commission expert committees by officials from the agencies and not by civil servants from the 
ministry level (Trondal 2001). Typically, Swedish ministries are responsible for the Council and 
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the comitology meetings while Swedish agencies are responsible for attending the Commission 
expert committees. However, in many cases Sweden will attend EU meetings with representative 
from both agencies and ministries. The Swedish EU membership has spurred a general need for 
intensified vertical co-ordination between the ministries and the agencies (Sundström 1999).  
 
Furthermore, it has become important for the Government to survey and control the international 
networks of the sector ministries, particularly those that the agencies execute independently of 
the ministries. However, the Government seems to lack comprehensive overviews of the 
international engagements of the agencies. The integration of Swedish agencies into the decision-
making machinery of the European Commission has spured a debate on the functionality of the 
dual Swedish government system (Jacobsson 1999).  
 
The Swedish EU membership has observable implications on actual decision-making processes 
in the Swedish central administration. One notable effect is seen on processes of horizontal and 
vertical co-ordination within the Swedish government. Notably, the EU membership has 
challenged the vertical (hierarchical) co-ordination of EU dossiers between the politico-
administrative leadership and the individual civil servants, and vertically between ministries and 
agencies. After the EU accession in 1995 the sheer volume of horizontal and vertical co-
ordination has increased within the Swedish government system (Sundström 1999). In particular, 
the co-ordinating role of the Swedish FO is increasingly supplemented by co-ordination 
responsibilities of the PMO and by co-ordinating activities of medium rank civil servants within 
sector ministries and agencies. The co-ordination of Swedish EU affairs is also conducted 
through a small, collegial inter-ministerial committee system. However, the typical mode of co-
ordinating EU dossiers is through informal personal contacts without written agendas and 
instructions. A problem that soon became obvious after 1995 was the problem of holding on to 
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the principle of collective decision-making. Since the Swedish Constitution stipulates an 
extensive collective responsibility by the Government the Swedish Government has adopted a 
tradition of frequent Cabinet meetings. This includes weekly formal Cabinet meetings, informal 
Cabinet meetings and Cabinet meetings almost every day for so-called lunch deliberations 
(Larsson 1986). The EU membership has made it harder to stick to the principle of collective 
decision-making.1 Even the old Cabinet method of mutual exchange, i.e. of important 
documents, is severely challenged due to the externally (EU-determined) deadlines of the 
European Commission (Ekengren 2002). The difficulties that the Chancery had with co-
ordination prior to the EU accession have multiplied after the EU accession. Hence, despite 
increased need for co-ordination by the Cabinet towards the Council of Ministers, the capacity 
for co-ordination is reduced by the sheer pace-making role of Commission deadlines (Ekengren 
2002).  
 
The Swedish EU membership has accompanied new administrative perceptions of time 
(Ekengren 2002). The decision-making processes within the Swedish central administration have 
always followed fixed circular rhythms dictated by rutinised events and rituals. Typically, budget 
cycles affected the level and character of activity in the central administration (Larsson 1986). 
However, the European Commission has added additional, faster and more ambiguous external 
rhythms and time schedule to the Swedish central administration, challenging the potential for 
politico-administrative control over domestic EU decision-making processes (Ekengren 2002). In 
short, the entry of Commission timing in Swedish government has lead to an increased need for, 
but a lack of capacity for, horizontal and vertical co-ordination. The increased co-ordination 
efforts are most visible in the later stages of the decision-making process, when dossiers enter the 
Council negotiations (cf. Figure 2). In the agenda setting phases in the European Commission the 
different domestic ministries and agencies have a much freer hand to formulate idiosyncratic 
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agendas (cf Figure 1). Still, across the Commission-Council spectrum, Ekengren (2002:152-153) 
shows that “EU time” have propelled a weakening of domestic hierarchical governance. 
 
A survey conducted by Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen (2004) shows a similar pattern. A large 
majority of the heads of unit in Swedish ministries, heavily involved in Commission decision-
making processes, feel a lack of time to consult the political leadership, the EU secretariat of the 
FO, and the PMO. The co-ordinating role of the sectoral ministries and agencies have grown 
while the role of the Swedish FO is increasingly pictured as that of a ”post box” (Sundström 
1999). Different parts of the Swedish bureaucratic machinery have established independent 
relationships with Commission DGs, bypassing overall co-ordination by the Swedish FO. The 
informal work patterns within the Commission expert committees accompany weak incentives 
for domestic inter-ministerial co-ordination (cf. Figure 1) (Statskontoret 2004:6:24). Towards the 
Council of Ministers, much co-ordination activity seems to be achieved through informal 
personal contacts without written agendas (cf. Figure 2) (Sundström 1999). The survey of 
Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen (2004) indicates a stronger effort for co-ordination between 
ministries and especially internally within each ministry (cf. Statskontoret 2004:6). The European 
Commission and the Council of Ministers thus seem to have differentiated impact on intra-
ministerial and inter-ministerial co-ordination in the Swedish central administration. In 2004 a 
special secretariat for the co-ordination of everyday EU affairs (especially those related to the 
Council) moved from the FO to the PMO. This reform indicates that the Swedish Prime Minister 
has the ambition to get a tighter grip of EU affairs in the Swedish central administration. The 
trend towards a stronger PMO is observed in all the 15 “old” EU member-states (Mittag and 
Wessels 2003:423). 
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The co-ordination of Swedish positions towards the EU is also conducted by the 
parliamentary committee for EU affairs in the Swedish Riksdag. EU dossiers to be discussed 
in upcoming meetings in the Council of Ministers must be discussed ex ante by the advisory 
committee for EU Affairs in the Riksdag. This routine forces the central administration to 
inform the political leadership prior to their confrontations in the Riksdag (cf. Figure 2). 
However, the Riksdag may not, in contrast to the Danish system on which it is modelled, 
issue formally binding mandates on the Government on EU dossiers (Bergman 1997, 
Hegeland 1999). A recent study demonstrates that the EU advisory committee of the Swedish 
Riksdag convene more meetings, handle more dossiers and have stronger administrative 
resources than the corresponding Norwegian Parliamentary committee (Melsæther and 
Sverdrup 2004:15). Nevertheless, the Swedish Riksdag has had severe difficulties in entering 
the early stages of the decision-making process of the European Commission 
(Riksdagskommittén 2004). The Swedish co-ordination system is based on the centralised 
British and Danish system with great emphasis on formal control of domestic representatives. 
The importance attached to the role of the Riksdag relates to the Swedish belief that the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU system is ultimately vested in democratic processes within 
the member-states and a belief in centralised institutions and hierarchical processes as means 
of gate keeping the pooling of authority from national to supranational governments (Beyers 
and Trondal 2004).  
 
The European Commission often consults external expertise when initiating new pieces of 
legislation (Van Schendelen 1998). In Sweden this usually means that civil servants from the 
agencies are consulted (Trondal 2001). In contrast to deliberations in the Council working 
groups and the comitology committees where civil servants are supposed to work under 
domestic instructions, the role perceptions of Swedish officials attending Commission expert 
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groups are more ambiguious (Beyers and Trondal 2004). Sometimes this creates paradoxical 
situations and potentially conflicting roles for Swedish representatives in the Commission 
expert committees (Statskontoret 2000:20A:35). Whereas Swedish officials who attend 
Commission expert committees may arrive with ambiguous mandates, Jacobsson (1999) 
observes that Swedish civil servants from sector ministries became increasingly aware of their 
national role after entering the Council system in 1995. The Swedish EU membership spurred 
a demand for co-ordinated Swedish positions among sector-experts who attended the Council 
working groups (cf. Figure 2). In ”Circulation Paper I” distributed by the EU Unit in the 
Swedish FO the possibility of issuing instructions on a case-by-case basis is mentioned. Still, 
the host of decision-making processes in the Swedish central administration directed towards 
the Commission are often handled by officials in middle or lower rank positions that often has 
a fairly free mandate vis-a-vis its own politico-administrative leadership (cf. Figure 1) 
(Trondal 2001).   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Ten years after Norway and Sweden integrated differently into the EU apparatus we see a 
profound and differentiated impact on the day-to-day decision-making processes unfolding 
within the Norwegian and Swedish central administrations. This study reveals that the 
decision-making processes within the Norwegian central administration are strongly sector-
penetrated by the European Commission. Similar observations are found within the Swedish 
administrative fabric accompanying a de-hierarchisation of the actual decision-making 
processes (cf. Figure 1). The European Commission fosters a rift between domestic 
Government responsibility and domestic Government control over the decision-making 
processes unfolding within the Norwegian and Swedish central administrations. These 
observations support the‘administrative integration approach’ as suggested in this study. In 
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accordance with this approach the European Commission activates the lower echelons of the 
domestic government hierarchies, notably sector experts within sector agencies and sector 
ministries. The European Commission fosters a de-activation of the domestic politico-
administrative leadership, the FO and the PMO. Henceforth, the empirical observations 
indicate that the actual decision-making processes that unfold within domestic government 
institutions are strongly conditioned by the Commission structure, as indicated in Figure 1.  
 
Supportive to the ‘administrative integration approach’, the Council of Ministers has led to 
increased co-ordination activity within the Swedish FO, PMO and generally among the 
politico-administrative leadership in the Swedish central administration (cf. Figure 2). This is 
also observed in the UK central administration, where the EU membership has strengthened 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Cabinet and the UKREP to the EU (Bulmer and 
Burch 2005; Massey 2004: 27). Notably, the Council of Ministers seem to strengthen the 
domestic pyramidal hierarchy of governance (cf. Figure 2). 
 
In support of the ‘administrative robustness approach’, the impact of the EU institutions is 
received differently within different parts of the domestic government apparatus. This study 
reveals a stronger de-hierachisation of decision-making processes at the agency-level than at 
the ministry-level in both countries. The European Commission seems to contribute to a de-
hierarchisation of decision-making processes within Norwegian and Swedish agencies more 
than within Norwegian and Swedish ministries. Hence, this study highlights how domestic 
government institutions mediate and filter the differentiated impact of the European 
Commission and the Council of Ministers. When agency and ministry officials attend the 
same Commission expert committees, ministry officials tend to be more strongly co-ordinated 
from the politico-administrative leadership than agency officials; and officials from the FO 
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tend to be more strongly mandated than officials from the sector ministries. EU dossiers are 
largely organised into existing ministerial structures and procedures both within the 
Norwegian and the Swedish central administrations. These observations indicate that despite 
ten years of differentiated integration into the EU, domestic government structures and 
procedures leave strong imprints on decision-making processes within the Norwegian and 
Swedish central administrative fabric. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: A Model of sector-integration across levels of governance 
 
 Figure 2: A Model of territorial integration across levels of governance 
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